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Cryptographic hash functions have been used to a great extent in many applications;
most importantly, as building blocks for digital signature schemes and message au-
thentication codes (MACs), as well as in commitment schemes, password protection,
key derivation, and almost every practical cryptographic protocol. Unlike many
other cryptographic primitives which are usually intended to fulfill specific security
notions, hash functions, as workhorses of cryptography, are often expected to sat-
isfy a wide and application dependent spectrum of security notions, ranging from
merely being a one-way function to acting as a truly random function or random
oracle (ideal hash).
In this Thesis, we revisit the theory and application of cryptographic hash func-
tions. We provide new contributions to this field, which has been explored for over
three decades, yet remains a highly active and interesting area of research. We
pursue, in particular, a line of research considering essential theoretical questions in
regard to the security features of hash functions, including formal definitions of se-
curity notions, the relationships among different security notions, and the possibility
of designing property-preserving domain extension transforms for hash functions.
First, we study notions of security for cryptographic hash functions. Our main
goal in this part is to consider the two essential theoretical questions in regard
to security notions for hash functions; namely, formal definitions of security notions
and the relationships among different security notions. Our contribution in this part
includes: a clear categorization of security notions, the introduction of a new set of
enhanced security notions and, most importantly, a full picture of the relationships
among the security notions.
We then investigate the property preservation capabilities of domain extension
transforms for hash functions. Almost all cryptographic hash functions are designed
based on the following two-step approach: first, a compression function is designed
which is only capable of hashing fixed-length messages, then, a domain extension
v
transform is applied to obtain a full-fledged hash function. The possibility of de-
signing a property-preserving domain extension transform, which is also known as
a property-preserving mode of operation, is an important problem to be considered
with regard to the construction of secure hash functions. We make the following
two contributions. Firstly, we analyse the most powerful multi-property-preserving
(MPP) domain extension transforms for hash functions in the literature, and provide
a full picture of their MPP capabilities with regard to a large collection of known
security notions. Secondly, we investigate the capabilities of several different do-
main extension transforms in regard to preserving an interesting recently proposed
security notion, called enhanced target collision resistance (eTCR).
Finally, as an interesting application of hash functions, we consider manual chan-
nel message authentication protocols using hash functions. In the manual channel
model for message authentication, also known as the two-channel or SAS-based
model, the sender and the receiver are assumed to have access to a low-bandwidth
auxiliary channel, ensuring authentication, in addition to a typical insecure channel;
however, neither they share any secret information nor there is any trusted public
key infrastructure (PKI). We investigate the problem of random oracle instantiation
for a three-round interactive message authentication protocol (IMAP). We also pro-
vide an efficient non-interactive message authentication protocol (NIMAP) in the
manual channel model that is based on an eTCR hash function.
vi
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